Trayvon Martin: The prosecution is not crumbling

March 26, 2013

Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Now that W8 (Dee Dee) has apparently admitted during the defense deposition on March 13th that she lied when she told Benjamin Crump during a telephone interview and later confirmed to BDLR that she did not go to Trayvon Martin’s funeral because she was sick and went to a hospital, the inevitable question is:

How might this affect the trial?

First, do not expect to see her charged with perjury because BDLR’s question was ambiguous (i.e., went to a hospital or someplace) and her answer was not material (i.e., important enough to affect the outcome of the trial).

Second, let’s take a look at how this admission might come out at trial.

BDLR would ask her if she attended the wake or the funeral and she would answer, “No.”

BDLR would then ask her why not and she probably would answer that she was too upset and could not handle it.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the prosecution either did not move in limine (i.e., before the trial begins) to prohibit the defense from pursuing this line of inquiry pursuant to Rule 608(b) or if it did, Judge Nelson denied the motion, BDLR would have the option to end that line of inquiry (i.e., permitting the defense to bring it out on cross) or to proceed further and reveal her lie).

Any experienced prosecutor, and BDLR is experienced, would elect to reveal her lie in the least damaging manner possible rather than allow the defense to bring it out on cross in the most damaging manner possible.

This is how it might work:

BDLR: Do you recall Benjamin Crump interviewing you by phone in March of last year regarding your cell phone conversations with Trayvon before the shooting?

DD: Yes.

BDLR: Do you recall him asking you, if you went to Trayvon’s wake and funeral?

DD: Yes.

BDLR: What, if anything did you tell him?

DD: I told him that I did not go to either one.

BDLR: Was that truth?

DD: Yes.

BDLR: Did he ask why you did not go the funeral and the wake?

DD: Yes.

BDLR: What did you tell him?

DD: I told him I was sick and went to the hospital.

BDLR: Was that the truth?

DD: No.

BDLR: What was the truth?

DD: I was too upset and could not handle it.

BDLR: Why didn’t you tell him that?

DD: I did not want to admit to his mother that I was not strong enough to be there for her.

BDLR: Are you referring to Sybrina Fulton?

DD: Yes.

BDLR: Was Trayvon’s mother present when Mr. Crump interviewed you?

DD: Yes, she was in Mr. Crump’s office listening over the speaker phone.

BDLR: How did you know that?

DD: Mr. Crump introduced her and she said, “Hello.”

BDLR: Did there come a later time when I interviewed you in person?

DD: Yes.

BDLR: Do you recall when that was?

DD: I think it was about a month later.

BDLR: Was Trayvon’s mother present when I interviewed you?

DD: Yes, she gave me a ride to the office where you interviewed me and she sat next to me the whole time.

BDLR: Did you swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth during the interview?

DD: Yes.

BDLR: Did I ask you if you went to the funeral and the wake?

DD: Yes.

BDLR: What did you say?

DD: I lied and told you that my blood pressure was very high and I went to the hospital instead.

BDLR: Do you suffer from high blood pressure?

DD: Yes.

BDLR: Why did you lie to me?

DD: I did not want to admit to Trayvon’s mother that I could not deal with what happened to Trayvon. I could not handle seeing him dead or in a casket, so I lied to her and to Mr. Crump.

BDLR: Are you sorry that you lied?

DD: Yes.

BDLR: Have you apologized to Trayvon’s mom and dad.

DD: Yes.

BDLR: Did you love Trayvon?

DD: Yes, I still do.

BDLR: Do you miss him?

DD: Yes, very much.

BDLR: Thank you. Your witness, counsel.

Picture this scene taking place before a jury in a crowded courtroom in June with a nation and the world looking on, after the prosecution has introduced all of its damning evidence against the defendant, including the medical examiner’s testimony using graphic color photos taken during the autopsy, as this young woman confesses her love and affection for Trayvon while baring her soul and tearfully confessing to her overwhelming sense of loss, responsibility, confusion, weakness and guilt.

If BDLR conducts the direct examination properly, as I believe he will, the best cross will be no cross. The jury will not take kindly to a defense attorney picking on her and prolonging her agony.

Finally, do not forget that the phone records and the other evidence in the case will independently confirm everything else she says about her conversation with Trayvon.

One understandable simple lie by Dee Dee is relatively unimportant compared to the vast ocean of lies uttered by the defendant in this case.

Is the prosecution crumbling? I don’t think so.

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83 Comments | Autopsy, Bernie de la Rionda, Crime, Dee Dee, fogen, George Zimmerman, Judge Deborah Nelson, Mark O'Mara, Medical Examiner, Murder 2, Perjury, Self-defense, Sybrina Fulton, Trayvon Martin | Tagged: , , , | Permalink
Posted by masonblue

Practicum: Did the police have probable cause to arrest George Zimmerman the night of the shooting

March 25, 2013

Monday, March 25, 2013

Write down or memorize these rules:

1. A police officer must have probable cause (i.e., reasonable grounds) to believe that a suspect committed a specific crime before he arrests the suspect. If he arrests a suspect without probable cause, the arrest is unlawful.

2. Whether probable cause exists depends on the totality of the circumstances.

3. A person is under arrest if a reasonable person in the same situation would not believe they were free to terminate the contact with the officer and leave the area.

4. Pursuant to the exclusionary rule, all evidence seized from a suspect after an unlawful arrest cannot be used against the suspect.

5. A person subjected to an unlawful arrest has a cause of action against the arresting officer for all damages caused by the unlawful arrest.

Now, let’s take a look at the Trayvon Martin case and decide whether the police had probable cause to believe that the defendant unlawfully killed Trayvon (i.e., that he did not kill him in self-defense).

They certainly knew he killed him because he admitted that he did.

What else did they know?

The had the recorded NEN call, the recorded 911 calls, various witness interviews at the scene of the shooting, the EMT’s report regarding the defendant’s physical condition and injuries, the photographs of the defendant taken at the station house, and the defendant’s statements at the station house.

Do not consider the results of the autopsy, forensic analysis at the crime lab, and other evidence obtained after the first night.

Pretend you are the judge.

Is that information sufficient to constitute reasonable grounds to believe the defendant did not kill Trayvon Martin in self-defense?

Next question:

Notwithstanding that he was permitted to leave the station house after submitting to an interrogation, was the defendant under arrest at any point that evening?

With the exception that I have given you the rules that must be applied and y’all can collaborate with each other, these two questions are similar to and probably were asked on more than one Criminal Procedure final exam in law school.

Who will be the first to provide an answer?

189 Comments | Arrest, fogen, George Zimmerman, Practicum, Probable Cause, Probable cause to arrest, Self-defense, Trayvon Martin | Tagged: , , , , | Permalink
Posted by masonblue

Post trial immunity hearings are a terrible idea

March 11, 2013

Monday, March 11, 2013

Good morning:

I write today to clear up some remaining uncertainty regarding the timing for a motion for immunity and the immunity hearing.

The motion for immunity is similar to a motion to suppress evidence because, if the motion is granted, the case is over.

Hearings on potentially outcome-determinative motions, such as a motion to suppress evidence, are always held before trial because, if the moving party wins (i.e., the defendant), the case is dismissed and there is no trial. If the defendant loses, the case proceeds to trial, unless he pleads guilty.

For example, let us suppose that a police officer arrested a defendant without probable cause and discovered a rock of crack cocaine in a pocket in the defendant’s jacket during the search incident to the arrest. The defendant is charged with possession of cocaine and pleads not guilty at the arraignment.

The defendant moves to suppress the rock before trial on the ground that the arrest and subsequent search were unlawful because the officer arrested him without probable cause. But for the unlawful arrest, the rock would not have been discovered. Thus, the rock is a “fruit of the poisonous tree” and must be suppressed pursuant to the exclusionary rule. That is, evidence seized unlawfully from a defendant by police cannot be used against the defendant at trial.

Without the cocaine, the prosecution would be unable to prove that the defendant possessed cocaine. Therefore, it would have to dismiss the case and the court would have to grant the motion.

An immunity hearing is similar. If the defendant prevails, the court must grant immunity from criminal prosecution and civil suit. Therefore, the outcome is similar to the motion to suppress. The prosecution cannot proceed and the court must dismiss the case.

While it is theoretically possible to merge a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence into a trial, there is little sense to do so because the issues and attorney strategies are different.

For example, the direct and cross examination of the arresting officer for purposes of the suppression motion will be focused on whether the officer had probable cause to arrest, whereas, the legality of the arrest and subsequent search is not an issue for purposes of the trial. It’s just something that happened and no longer relevant to the ultimate issue the jury must decide. That is, whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.

I have provided the simplest example of a motion to suppress evidence. They can be far more complicated and last more than one day, such as might be the case when multiple locations are searched, some with search warrants and some without. It makes no sense to waste the juror’s time and risk confusing them with irrelevant evidence and issues.

In the federal and state courts in which I practiced, the courts set deadlines within which to file motions to suppress. Failure to comply with a deadline typically meant the motion was waived, unless you had a good reason for not filing the motion, such as newly discovered evidence that you did not know prior to the deadline.

Federal and state judges hate to summon people for jury duty for cases that can be potentially resolved by outcome-determinative motions prior to trial. They hate even more having to waste jury time with evidence that is irrelevant to the issues the jury must decide.

Although constitutional rights are at stake during hearings on motions to suppress evidence, the courts can and do hold that those rights are waived by failing to assert them in timely fashion.

Just as notice and an opportunity to be heard are important to due process of law, so too is finality. Legal issues that can be decided should be decided. I cannot think of a good reason not to decide the issue of immunity before trial and to deem it waived, if it is not.

I have already written about the potential for constitutional error requiring reversal of a conviction and remand for a new trial here and here, if an immunity hearing is merged into a trial and will not revisit that issue today.

However, I will comment regarding the idea that an immunity hearing could be conducted after trial.

If a jury returns a guilty verdict, the case is over. Since the defendant’s guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury necessarily must have decided that the prosecution proved absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. The verdict precludes a finding that the defendant proved self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Therefore, the immunity motion must be denied.

If the jury acquits the defendant, however, either judge or jury could theoretically decide that the defendant had met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in self-defense.

The problem in this situation, however, is that the jury may have acquitted a defendant who did not testify or offer any evidence, which a defendant has a right to do.

Should he now be permitted to put on a case to prove that he acted in self-defense?

Does he have a right to have the jury decide that issue or must the judge decide the issue.

What happens if the defendant testifies and the judge or jury decides they do not believe the defendant and now want to find him guilty?

I do not see any easy answers to these questions.

There is no doubt that the legislature intended that the issue of immunity should be raised and decided before trial and I can think of no good reason to do otherwise.

If I were the judge, I would hold a hearing as soon as possible to consider whether the immunity hearing can be merged with the trial or considered after trial, and if after trial, whether the judge or the jury should decide whether to grant immunity.

These are extremely important issues that should be considered and resolved before trial to avoid a lot of grief later.

If no action is taken, we can only sit back and watch a slow-motion train wreck.

Finally, I want everyone to know that I firmly believe that the defense does not want to have an immunity hearing because they have no defense and the defendant would be crucified on cross examination exposing him to be the liar that he is. They obviously do not want to admit this, so they allowed the court to strike the hearing without formally and publicly waiving it. I doubt that we will hear more from the defense about this issue, since they want it to disappear.

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1,759 Comments | fogen, George Zimmerman, Self-defense, Stand Your Ground, Suppression Hearing, SYG Immunity Hearing, Trayvon Martin | Tagged: , , , | Permalink
Posted by masonblue

Witness 8′s (Dee Dee) alleged lies do not matter

March 7, 2013

Thursday, March 7, 2013

I write today to remind everyone that DD is not a critical prosecution witness because they can win this case without her testimony and her alleged lies about her age and whether she went to a hospital, instead of the funeral, probably are not admissible.

She is not a critical prosecution witness because the physical evidence, forensics, location of Trayvon’s body and the spent shell casing, and the defendant’s conflicting and inconsistent statements bury him beneath a mountain of evidence.

Although we will not know until trial, I am anticipating that the defendant’s interlocking phone calls with others before and after he killed Trayvon will eliminate any lingering doubt that anyone might have about his guilt. Even if it does not, I do not believe the prosecution’s case will be in any jeopardy.

BDLR will likely wait to call DD until late in his case after he has put in all of the evidence that he believes he needs to introduce in order to convict the defendant. With everything else in place, her testimony will merely confirm what everyone on the jury already knows. The jury likely will believe her because her testimony will be self-authenticating. That is, even though she had never been to the RTL, everything that she says Trayvon told her will be confirmed by the interlocking phone records of the calls she had with Trayvon, the physical layout of the place and the weather.

Because most of Trayvon’s statements to her are inadmissible hearsay, unless he was relating a present sense impression or excited utterance, which are two exceptions to the hearsay rule, I expect her testimony will be limited to he told her that,

(1) he was afraid of the creepy guy following him in the car;

(2) he ran to get away from him; the creepy guy suddenly showed up on foot; and

(3) he asked someone why he was following him;

Then she heard an older male voice respond, “What are you doing here?”

Then she heard what sounded like physical contact followed by Trayvon shouting, “Get off me,” and the phone went dead. She attempted to call him, but he did not answer.

That’s it. She does not know anything else.

The defendant’s supporters with considerable support from the lame-stream U.S. media and various lawyer-pundits who should know better have been saying things like, “The prosecution’s case is crumbling,” because Witness 8 (DD) lied or committed perjury,

(1) about her age; and

(2) when she claimed that she did not attend Trayvon’s wake or funeral because she was not feeling well and went to a hospital.

The prosecution’s case is not crumbling.

First, even assuming she lied, and I do not believe that she did, she most certainly did not commit perjury because neither of her statements are about matters that are material or important to the outcome of this case. Since materiality is an element that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to convict someone of perjury, there is no basis to charge her with that offense.

Second, the two alleged lies do not make it more or less likely that she is an untruthful person since a truthful person may lie about their age or when providing an excuse for not attending a funeral.

The rules of evidence permit Judge Nelson to exercise her discretion in deciding whether to permit the defense to cross examine DD about these two alleged lies.

The relevant rules of evidence are 608(b) and 403.

Evidence Rule 608(b) prohibits evidence of specific instances of the misconduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking her credibility, unless those specific instances of misconduct concern her character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.

(Emphasis supplied)

Evidence Rule 403 provides that even relevant evidence may be excluded if the judge finds that its probative value “is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”

(Emphasis supplied)

I can see Judge Nelson deciding that the slight probative value of the two alleged lies that she is an untruthful person is overwhelmed by their potential prejudice, since the alleged lies have nothing to do with any issues in the case, and her testimony is self-authenticating.

The admissibility of evidence about these two alleged lies probably will be the subject of a motion in limine by the prosecution for an order to prohibit the defense from mentioning them in front of the jury or cross examining her about them.

Even if Judge Nelson denies that motion, the prosecution can minimize the potential damage of that evidence by bringing it out on direct and asking her to tell the jury why she did not tell the truth about those two matters.

The defense would have to be careful cross examining her because the jury might not like it, if they do not treat her in a respectful manner.

When all is said and done by the witnesses and the lawyers, and the jury retires to deliberate on a verdict, I doubt that DD’s credibility will be a matter of any concern or discussion regarding whether the defendant killed Trayvon in self-defense.

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615 Comments | Bernie de la Rionda, Crime, Dee Dee, Elements of a Crime, Evidence, Exceptions, Excited Utterance, fogen, George Zimmerman, Hearsay Rule, Judge Deborah Nelson, Murder 2, Perjury, Present Sense Impression, Reputation for Veracity, Self-defense, Trayvon Martin | Tagged: , , , | Permalink
Posted by masonblue

Nitty Gritty: Three Questions for Jury to Answer in Trayvon Martin Murder Case

December 31, 2012

Monday, December 31, 2012

Thankfully, 2012 will soon pass into the rearview mirror.

As we look forward to next year, I think today is a good day to review the three predominant questions that the jury will have to decide when the defendant charged with murdering Trayvon Martin goes to trial. I posted this comment last night.

Actually, O’Mara has conceded that SYG and the castle doctrine do not apply and the evidence will show that, as a matter of law, the defendant was the aggressor.

As the aggressor, the defendant can use deadly force in self-defense only if,

(a) Trayvon responded to his aggression by using more force than was reasonably necessary to defend himself;

(b) He reasonably perceived that Trayvon’s use of such force created an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury; and

(c) He attempted to end the confrontation and withdraw before he used deadly force.

O’Mara announced at a press conference that he will argue that the defendant could not withdraw before using deadly force because the defendant was lying on his back unable to withdraw with Trayvon straddling him raining down blows MMA style and slamming his head into the concrete sidewalk.

Those are the basic three questions that the jury will have to decide.

The Court will instruct the jury to presume the answer to all 3 questions is “Yes,” and the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer is “No.”

Keep in mind that, as a practical matter, the defendant will have to testify and that means he will be cross examined, thoroughly.

Malisha was the only person to attempt an answer and this is what she said:

Professor, thanks for the clarity.

The three questions. I love them. I always love “three questions.”

(a) Did Trayvon respond to Fogen’s aggression by using more force than was reasonably necessary to defend himself?

I think the answer “NO” is easy to prove because in fact Fogen killed Trayvon. Thus, Fogen’s aggression against Trayvon was, by definition, potentially lethal from the get-go. Thus, also by definition, deadly force was authorized.

(b) Did Fogen reasonably perceive that Trayvon’s use of such force created an imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury to himself, to Fogen?

I think the answer “NO” is also easy to prove because injuries that Fogen sustained were nowhere near life-threatening. If he was beaten at all, he was beaten in such a way as to do no serious damage. A fender bender would have hurt him more than the encounter with Trayvon Martin hurt him, even if both scratches on his head AND a minor injury to his nose were all attributable to contact with Trayvon Martin.

(c) Did Fogen attempt to end the confrontation and withdraw before he used deadly force?

Fogen has not even claimed that he did so. Even as he narrated his non-credible self-defense story, he claims that he told the neighbor to help him “restrain” Trayvon Martin, but he never told Trayvon Martin that he wanted to stop fighting. Nor did he tell Trayvon Martin, at any point (according to his own narrative) that he had a gun and would shoot unless Trayvon Martin stopped hurting him. Remember, even as he narrated that he “spread out [Trayvon's] hands,” he still claimed that Trayvon was continuing to struggle and curse. And at no time before or after firing his one shot did Fogen say, “I’m leaving now; I’m going back to my schtruck now; I’ll leave you alone now,” or even, “The police are coming so stop fighting now and we’ll wait for them.”

Now it is your turn. What are your thoughts?

How do you think the defendant will do on cross examination?

I also will start an open thread for those who wish to discuss other matters.

Many thanks and many blessings to all of you for participating and making this blog a great and safe place to discuss the case.

Happy New Year!!!!!!!!

Fred

289 Comments | Crime, Featuring, George Zimmerman, Jury Instructions, Malisha, Murder 2, Murder 2 FL, Nitty Gritty, Self-defense, Self-Defense (SYG) FL, Stand Your Ground, Theories of the Case, Trayvon Martin | Permalink
Posted by masonblue

The Two Photographs of the Defendant’s Head Damage the Defense

December 17, 2012

Monday, December 17, 2012

After reviewing and considering the remarks by Zhickel, Grbsb, Jun and Whonoze (AKA: Treeslaw), I am going to put on my judge’s robe and issue the following ruling:

I find that neither photograph was altered and, therefore, both photographs are authentic and admissible at trial.

This is not a bad result for the State, as you will soon see.

In effect and by design, because I set it up this way, we have had our own internet version of a battle-of-experts pretrial hearing regarding the admissibility of the two digital photographs taken at the scene of the homicide by Officer Wagner (face) and the neighbor named Jon (back of the head).

The legal issue was whether the photos were authentic (i.e., originals or authentic reproductions) or fraudulent reproductions (i.e., altered).

Zhickle (nice to see your fonts again) and Grbsb in effect testified as experts for the defense while Jun and Whonoze testified as experts for the State.

There has to be a winner and on balance I decided for the defense because giving them what they want on this issue does not hurt the State’s case and I did not want to give them an appellate issue that might result in reversing the defendant’s conviction.

In other words, I am thinking strategically, or big picture, rather than focusing on the relative merits of each argument.

I predict Judge Nelson will reach the same conclusion for the same reason.

Just as I would do, I predict she will permit the prosecution to use their experts to acknowledge the distortions in the photos and explain why they are present, just as our four experts did. Such factors will go to the weight, or value of the evidence, rather than its admissibility.

The jury will decide how much weight to give to those photos. The greater the distortion, the less weight they are likely to be given.

The photos taken at the station house also will be admitted. Those photos together with expert testimony from one or more trauma surgeons should establish to a reasonable medical certainty that the defendant’s injuries, including his claimed but unverified “broken nose” were minor and inconsistent with the defendant’s narrative claiming how he got them.

The absence of any detectable trace of blood on the cuffs and lower sleeves of Trayvon Martin’s two sweatshirts and the absence of the defendant’s DNA in Trayvon Martin’s fingernail clippings also do not support the defendant’s narrative, as one would expect detectable amounts of the defendant’s blood and DNA in both areas. That is, despite the rain, detectable amounts of blood and DNA would have been present, if the defendant’s narrative were true.

In addition, the pattern of blood flow as depicted in the photo taken at the scene, before an EMT cleaned his head, shows blood flowing in a downward direction toward and curling around the lower end of his ears, which does not support the defendant’s claim that he was lying on his back. Instead, it shows that his head was upright and leaning forward, which is consistent with the defendant straddling Trayvon Martin, as several witnesses described him doing (Selma and the teacher).

These photos do not help the defense case. Considered together with the physical evidence, they appear to not only rule out the possibility that the defendant was reasonably in fear of imminent death or serious bodily injury, they also appear to rule out Trayvon Martin as the person who caused those wounds.

Given some minor scratches to his face, it appears more likely that the defendant ran into a tree branch in the dark bumping his nose and fell down bumping his head on some object, possibly a sprinkler head or cover, or possibly the edge of the cement sidewalk or a sign. Whatever caused them, it was not likely to have been Trayvon because there is no evidence that Trayvon Martin hit the defendant.

Even if he did hit him, I think the jury will find that he was legally justified to do so in self-defense because the defendant followed him first in his vehicle and then on foot into a dark area where he confronted and attempted to detain him without ever identifying himself, contrary to the police dispatcher’s admonition and the Neighborhood Watch rules.

I hope this exercise was helpful to a better understanding of hearings on motions in limine, battles between experts and the strategic considerations that inform judicial thinking.

Thanks to all of you for participating and please give me some feedback regarding whether this worked for you as a learning experience.

1,399 Comments | Evidence, Forensic Science, Self-defense, Trayvon Martin, George Zimmerman, Bloodstain Interpretation, Photoshoppd Photographs, Best Evidence Rule, Altered Digital Photographs, Zhickle, Grbsb, Whonoze (Treeslaw), Jun | Permalink
Posted by masonblue

Zimmerman Did Not Have a Reasonable Suspicion to Believe Martin had Committed, was Committing, or was about to Commit a Crime

November 11, 2012

Today, I am going to revisit the reasonable-suspicion rule that the SCOTUS established in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Even though George Zimmerman is a private individual and the rule only applies to contacts with people, such as Trayvon Martin, initiated by federal or state law enforcement officials for investigatory purposes, it is a fundamental rule that any student in a criminal justice program, such as George Zimmerman, can reasonably be expected to know.

First, the Rule:

Reasonable suspicion is a legal standard of proof in United States law that is less than probable cause, the legal standard for arrests and warrants, but more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ ”; it must be based on “specific and articulable facts”, “taken together with rational inferences from those facts”. Police may briefly detain a person if they have reasonable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity; such a detention is known as a Terry stop. If police additionally have reasonable suspicion that a person so detained may be armed, they may “frisk” the person for weapons, but not for contraband like drugs. Reasonable suspicion is evaluated using the “reasonable person” or “reasonable officer” standard, in which said person in the same circumstances could reasonably believe a person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity; it depends upon the totality of circumstances, and can result from a combination of particular facts, even if each is individually innocuous.

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22.

Second, why is this rule necessary?

Before the SCOTUS created this rule, police officials could initiate contact with a private individual, but could not lawfully detain that person for any length of time to investigate suspicious conduct, unless they had probable cause to arrest (i.e., reasonable grounds to believe the person had committed a crime). The SCOTUS created the reasonable-suspicion rule to apply to police initiated contacts with private individuals for investigation purposes to determine whether to arrest the person or let them go (i.e., whether, as a result of the contact, the officer developed probable cause to believe the person committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime).

The absence of a rule to cover investigatory stops meant that the person stopped had the right to voluntarily terminate the contact at any time, or sue for false arrest, if the officer refused to allow the person to leave. Also, if the detention turned into an arrest without probable cause and a search incident to that arrest that led to the discovery of incriminating evidence concealed on the person or perhaps an admission by the person that he had committed a crime, the evidence seized and/or the admission would not be admissible in court because it had been obtained in violation of the person’s right to privacy, a violation of the Fourth Amendment. This potentially dire consequence, given a suitably egregious suspect like a serial killer, is the result of the exclusionary rule, another SCOTUS created rule to deal with persistent police misconduct that no amount of criticism or warnings by the court appeared to have any effect.

Third, how about an example to clarify the distinction between a reasonable suspicion and probable cause to arrest. Ask and you shall receive. Here are the facts in Terry.

On October 31, 1963, while on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for many years, Cleveland Police Department detective Martin McFadden, aged 62,[1] saw two men, John W. Terry and Richard Chilton, standing on a street corner at 1276 Euclid Avenue and acting in a way the officer thought was suspicious. Detective McFadden, who was well-known on the Cleveland police force for his skill in apprehending pickpockets,[1] observed the two proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window. Each completion of the route was followed by a conference between the two on a corner. The two men repeated this ritual alternately between five and six times apiece—in all, roughly a dozen trips. After one of these trips, they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly after a brief conversation. Suspecting the two men of “casing a job, a stick-up”, detective McFadden followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a store.

The plainclothes officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. The men “mumbled something”, whereupon McFadden spun Terry around, patted down his outside clothing, and felt a pistol in his overcoat pocket. He reached inside the overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove the gun. The officer ordered the three into the store. He removed Terry’s overcoat, took out a revolver, and ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton’s outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under Terry’s or Chilton’s outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Terry and Chilton were subsequently charged with carrying concealed weapons.

Fourth, why is Terry relevant to the Zimmerman case.

George Zimmerman, who should have been familiar with the Terry rule, characterized Trayvon Martin’s conduct as suspicious; yet, there is nothing suspicious about it, unless one assumes that seeking shelter from a downpour in the mail shed early Sunday evening while young and Black and looking around at home addresses while walking fast in the rain is reasonably suspicious activity.

Remember that the word “reasonable” means an objective test. That is, whether a reasonable person or police officer in the same situation would have concluded that the behavior was suspicious.

Serino realized that Zimmerman profiled Martin and he knew that racial profiling is never reasonable. He was right.

Conclusion:

Even though the reasonable-suspicion rule does not apply technically to Zimmerman since he was not a police officer, he must have known about the rule or reasonably could have been expected to know it, such that his decision to hunt down Martin and prevent him from getting away, just like all of the other Black “assholes” who got away, is utterly indefensible.

Moreover, even if he had not shot him to death, but had “only” assaulted him in an effort to detain him for the police, he still would be guilty of a battery. Depending on whether he injured Martin while committing that battery, he might have been committed a felony.

Finally, if anyone had a right to use force in self-defense, that person was Trayvon Martin.

91 Comments | Fourth Amendment, George Zimmerman, Investigatory Stops, Reasonable Suspicion, Self-defense, Terry v Ohio Rule, Trayvon Martin, United States Supreme Court | Permalink
Posted by masonblue

Zimmerman: Representing Him and the Inevitable Question: My God, What Have I Become?

October 22, 2012

Brown posted this comment Sunday night at 8:31 pm:

“Correct, but what I was trying to convey was that DeeDee might not understand that he would of been justified. Let’s just say that yes TM told DeeDee that he might have to turn around and face this dude and fight him because he felt threaten. DeeDee as a young teen who doesn’t know anything about SYG, might not understand that TM would of been in the right. If you look through her eyes, she only sees TM a kid who doesn’t fight had to fight against a grown white man. Do you see how it might put her in a position of thinking that if she were to say something like that, her thought process might be, OH boy if I say that TM would be in the wrong. She doesn’t understand that the law was on his side as soon as GZ followed him.”

Although Brown’s comment is about Dee Dee, her comment also is applicable to what clients say to their attorneys. For example, I have previously stated that the Fifth Commandment mandates that lawyers should not assume that their clients tell them the truth.

Brown’s comment pinpoints one of the reasons why clients will lie to their lawyers. For example, because the client might not realize that he has a valid self-defense claim in a murder case where there were no eyewitnesses (or he fears that no one will believe him if he tells the truth), the client might tell the lawyer that he was at a family BBQ when the death occurred. This is a false alibi defense that he also might have provided to the police.

Now let us assume that you are the lawyer and your reliable investigator, Paul Drake, has interviewed everyone who was present at the family BBQ and no one recalls your client being there until a couple of hours after the victim was killed. In other words, your client had plenty of time to kill the victim and get to the BBQ before the witnesses saw him.

You decide to confront your client. Lawyers often refer to these confrontations as a “come-to-Jesus moment.”

After telling your client that his alibi defense is not going to work, he tells you what really happened. You realize that he is describing a situation that constitutes self-defense under the SYG law in your jurisdiction.

Let us say this happens mid-trial after the prosecution rests its case and now it’s time for the defense to go forward.

Now what do you do?

In Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), the SCOTUS considered a similar fact situation. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal defendant to assistance of counsel is not violated when an attorney refuses to cooperate with the defendant in presenting perjured testimony at his trial.

In a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Berger, the SCOTUS said:

Page 475 U. S. 160

I
A

Whiteside was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury verdict which was affirmed by the Iowa courts. The killing took place on February 8, 1977, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. Whiteside and two others went to one Calvin Love’s apartment late that night, seeking marihuana. Love was in bed when Whiteside and his companions arrived; an argument between Whiteside and Love over the marihuana ensued. At one point, Love directed his girlfriend to get his “piece,” and at another point got up, then returned to his bed. According to Whiteside’s testimony, Love then started to reach under his pillow and moved toward Whiteside. Whiteside stabbed Love in the chest, inflicting a fatal wound.

Whiteside was charged with murder, and when counsel was appointed, he objected to the lawyer initially appointed, claiming that he felt uncomfortable with a lawyer who had formerly been a prosecutor. Gary L. Robinson was then appointed, and immediately began an investigation. Whiteside gave him a statement that he had stabbed Love as the latter “was pulling a pistol from underneath the pillow on the bed.” Upon questioning by Robinson, however, Whiteside indicated that he had not actually seen a gun, but that he was convinced that Love had a gun. No pistol was found on the premises; shortly after the police search following the stabbing, which had revealed no weapon, the victim’s family had removed all of the victim’s possessions from the apartment. Robinson interviewed Whiteside’s companions who were present during the stabbing, and none had seen a gun during the incident. Robinson advised Whiteside that the existence of a gun was not necessary to establish the claim of self-defense, and that only a reasonable belief that the victim had a gun nearby was necessary, even though no gun was actually present.
Until shortly before trial, Whiteside consistently stated to Robinson that he had not actually seen a gun, but that he was

Page 475 U. S. 161

convinced that Love had a gun in his hand. About a week before trial, during preparation for direct examination, Whiteside for the first time told Robinson and his associate Donna Paulsen that he had seen something “metallic” in Love’s hand. When asked about this, Whiteside responded:

“[I]n Howard Cook’s case, there was a gun. If I don’t say I saw a gun, I’m dead.”

Robinson told Whiteside that such testimony would be perjury, and repeated that it was not necessary to prove that a gun was available, but only that Whiteside reasonably believed that he was in danger. On Whiteside’s insisting that he would testify that he saw “something metallic,” Robinson told him, according to Robinson’s testimony:

“[W]e could not allow him to [testify falsely], because that would be perjury, and, as officers of the court, we would be suborning perjury if we allowed him to do it; . . . I advised him that, if he did do that, it would be my duty to advise the Court of what he was doing, and that I felt he was committing perjury; also, that I probably would be allowed to attempt to impeach that particular testimony.”
App. to Pet. for Cert. A-85. Robinson also indicated he would seek to withdraw from the representation if Whiteside insisted on committing perjury. [Footnote 2]

Whiteside testified in his own defense at trial, and stated that he “knew” that Love had a gun, and that he believed Love was reaching for a gun, and he had acted swiftly in self-defense. On cross-examination, he admitted that he had not

Page 475 U. S. 162

actually seen a gun in Love’s hand. Robinson presented evidence that Love had been seen with a sawed-off shotgun on other occasions, that the police search of the apartment may have been careless, and that the victim’s family had removed everything from the apartment shortly after the crime. Robinson presented this evidence to show a basis for Whiteside’s asserted fear that Love had a gun.

The jury returned a verdict of second-degree murder, and Whiteside moved for a new trial, claiming that he had been deprived of a fair trial by Robinson’s admonitions not to state that he saw a gun or “something metallic.” The trial court held a hearing, heard testimony by Whiteside and Robinson, and denied the motion. The trial court made specific findings that the facts were as related by Robinson.
The Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed respondent’s conviction. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468 (1978). That court held that the right to have counsel present all appropriate defenses does not extend to using perjury, and that an attorney’s duty to a client does not extend to assisting a client in committing perjury. Relying on DR 7-102(A)(4) of the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, which expressly prohibits an attorney from using perjured testimony, and Iowa Code § 721.2 (now Iowa Code § 720.3 (1985)), which criminalizes subornation of perjury, the Iowa court concluded that not only were Robinson’s actions permissible, but were required. The court commended “both Mr. Robinson and Ms. Paulsen for the high ethical manner in which this matter was handled.”

B

Whiteside then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. In that petition, Whiteside alleged that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel and of his right to present a defense by Robinson’s refusal to allow him to testify as he had proposed. The District Court denied the writ. Accepting the state trial court’s factual finding that

Page 475 U. S. 163

Whiteside’s intended testimony would have been perjurious, it concluded that there could be no grounds for habeas relief, since there is no constitutional right to present a perjured defense.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and directed that the writ of habeas corpus be granted. Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323 (1984). The Court of Appeals accepted the findings of the trial judge, affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court, that trial counsel believed with good cause that Whiteside would testify falsely, and acknowledged that, under Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971), a criminal defendant’s privilege to testify in his own behalf does not include a right to commit perjury. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that an intent to commit perjury, communicated to counsel, does not alter a defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel, and that Robinson’s admonition to Whiteside that he would inform the court of Whiteside’s perjury constituted a threat to violate the attorney’s duty to preserve client confidences. [Footnote 3] According to the Court of Appeals, this threatened violation of client confidences breached the standards of effective representation set down in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). The court also concluded that Strickland’s prejudice requirement was satisfied by an implication of prejudice from the conflict between Robinson’s duty of loyalty to his client and his ethical duties. A petition for rehearing en banc was denied, with Judges Gibson, Ross, Fagg, and Bowman dissenting. Whiteside v. Scurr, 750 F.2d 713 (1984). We granted certiorari, 471 U.S. 1014 (1985), and we reverse.

I believe The SCOTUS decision in Nix v. Whiteside can be distinguished from the facts in my hypothetical because of the lack of certainty that the client intended to commit perjury.

This distinction is important as it helps to define the boundary between a lawyer’s duty to provide effective assistance of counsel to his client and his ethical and legal obligation not to assist the client to commit perjury to beat the charge.

Criminal defense attorneys routinely navigate close, but not too close, to the land of perjury.

Many times they do not want to know the truth and you should take that into account when you hear Mark O’Mara or any other criminal defense attorney speak about a case.

This is why I say that a criminal defense attorney should never judge his client. That responsibility is assigned to judges and juries.

But sometimes, you cannot help it and therein lies the rub as well as the doubt and the inevitable question:.

My God, what have I become?

102 Comments | Crime, Dee Dee, Defense Strategy, Ethical Obligations, George Zimmerman, Importance of Listening, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, Perjury, Representing the Difficult Client, Self-defense, Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, Stand Your Ground, Thirteen Commandments of Criminal Defense, Trayvon Martin, United States Supreme Court | Tagged: , , , , , , | Permalink
Posted by masonblue

Zimmerman Made Race an Issue with his False Description of Trayvon Martin

October 13, 2012

The Orlando Sentinel reports today that Mark O’Mara has filed motions in the Zimmerman case seeking,

“records from the FBI, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and local law-enforcement agencies that would reveal whether investigators found that Zimmerman was motivated by race or acted to deprive Trayvon of his civil rights.”

He claims that he filed these motions because he wants to eliminate race as an issue in this case. Apparently, he believes those law enforcement agencies have no such evidence and will admit that they do not, thereby ending speculation that George Zimmerman is a racist who profiled and killed Trayvon Martin because he is Black.

“In an unusually long blog post Wednesday, O’Mara wrote that if race is a factor in this case, it’s not because of Zimmerman — it’s because Sanford police did not make an immediate arrest.

“While it can be safely argued that it is largely the question of civil rights issues that has made the George Zimmerman case a national — and international — story, there is nothing to support the contention of racism in the Zimmerman case,” O’Mara wrote.

“… race should not be a factor in the George Zimmerman case and should never have been made one,” he concluded. “The Zimmerman defense team is not arguing against civil rights. We are defending a man who claims he shot and killed an attacker in necessary self-defense.”

O’Mara’s claim is nonsense. Race is an issue in this case because George Zimmerman made it an issue when he used a negative racial stereotype to describe Trayvon Martin in an effort to justify killing him in self-defense.

Trayvon Martin had just celebrated his 17th birthday. He was a kid walking home in the rain from an errand to a 7/11 store where he purchased Skittles and a can of iced tea. He was minding his own business talking to his girlfriend when Zimmerman spotted him and started following him first in a vehicle and then on foot. Martin panicked, ran away, and attempted to hide from him, but Zimmerman hunted him down contrary to a request by the SPD NEN dispatcher’s request. Then he shot and killed Martin during a struggle by shooting him at close range in the heart, despite knowing that police were on their way. Martin was unarmed and Zimmerman has admitted to having control of Martin with a wristlock before he pulled out his gun, aimed, and fired.

To escape legal responsibility for this murder, Zimmerman reversed the actual facts claiming that Martin hunted him down, despite having successfully eluded him, sucker-punched in the nose, and jumped on top of him raining down blows MMA-style while uttering B-movie Black gangsta-speak from the late 80s and 90s, and then he grabbed his head and repeatedly slammed it against a concrete sidewalk until he nearly lost consciousness. On the verge of losing consciousness, Zimmerman suddenly remembered he had a gun, unholstered it, and shot him to death.

Zimmerman and O’Mara ask us to believe this racist stereotype despite Zimmerman’s lack of injuries that are consistent with his description of what happened and forensic evidence that refutes it. He would have us believe that, while in mid-conversation with his girlfriend, Trayvon suddenly attacked him without bothering to arm himself with a weapon.

To believe Zimmerman, one must suspend disbelief and see Trayvon Martin as some sort of super Black gangsta that only exists in dated B movies.

Sorry, but I am not buying what O’Mara is selling. Zimmerman cannot credibly claim that he is not responsible for injecting race into this case when he is the person who is attempting to escape responsibility for murder by claiming he had to kill in self-defense because Trayvon Martin was some sort of super Black gangsta that only exists in dated B movies.

BTW, no one should hold their breath expecting “the FBI, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and local law-enforcement agencies,” to fall over each other in an effort to tell everyone that they have concluded that George Zimmerman is not a racist. O’Mara will get the discovery to which he is entitled as it is released and no special accommodation will be made for this request.

Because I believe he should know this, I assume this is yet another effort to try his case in the court of public opinion instead of a courtroom and yet another sign that he is not ready for prime time.

315 Comments | Blaming the Victim as a Defense Strategy, Crime, George Zimmerman, Murder 2, Playing the Race Card as a Defense Strategy, Self-defense, Trayvon Martin | Permalink
Posted by masonblue

Zimmerman: A Short and Concise Explanation why George Zimmerman is Guilty of Second Degree Murder

September 14, 2012

I. Introduction

Many thanks to Ada4750 for being a good sport and playing the role of devil’s advocate defending the proposition that Trayvon Martin may have provoked the fight with George Zimmerman (a) by not running all the way home to the safety of Brandy Green’s residence and (b) by confronting and assaulting Zimmerman for following him.

With Ada’s cooperation and Case 1′s unwavering analytical focus, we can now clearly see the underlying supposition for this claim; namely, Martin did not actually fear Zimmerman and chose to hide, ambush, confront and assault Zimmerman for daring to follow him.

ADA argues that Martin’s girlfriend’s (Dee Dee) testimony is absolutely critical to the outcome of the case because she is the only witness who can counter Zimmerman’s claim that Martin was the aggressor. In other words, if the jury does not believe Dee Dee’s claim that Martin told her he was afraid of the creepy man following him, it might decide Zimmerman is not guilty.

I will show why this argument is not valid and the jury does not have to believe Dee Dee to reject Zimmerman’s claim of self-defense and find him guilty of second degree murder.

In any event, her testimony will be supported by her phone records and confirmed by Zimmerman’s own statements describing Martin’s flight, disappearance from view, and import of their initial exchange of words, if not their exact words (i.e., Martin’s question why are you following me and Zimmerman’s response, why are you here?)

II. Analysis

A. Zimmerman is on trial, not Martin

The prosecution must emphasize and the jury must never forget the central truth of this case: Trayvon Martin is not on trial; George Zimmerman is on trial because he did five things that caused Trayvon Martin’s death and then he lied to the police to cover-up what he did.

(1) He should have left his gun at home because the Neighborhood Watch Program (NWP) forbids carrying a gun;

(2) He should have remained in his vehicle because the NWP forbids running after potential suspects to prevent them from getting away before the police arrive;

(3) He should have left his gun in his vehicle and immediately returned to his vehicle after the dispatcher told him to stop following Martin, instead of continuing to follow and hunt Martin down after Martin disappeared;

(4) He should not have fired his weapon because his aggressive intentions and conduct created the situation in which he found himself;

(5) He should not have fired his weapon because we know from the evidence of his injuries and the forensic evidence at the scene that he was never reasonably in imminent danger of being killed or seriously injured, regardless of what he may have believed; and

(6) He never should have lied to the police because his lies establish his guilty state of mind just as effectively as a signed confession.

B. Martin’s character and whether he feared Zimmerman are irrelevant

It does not matter whether Tratvon Martin was the most evil and violent man who ever lived, the most meek and mild man who ever lived, or something in between. Plug-in any personality you can imagine and you still have these incontrovertible facts:

(1) Martin was unarmed;

(2) As a visitor at Brandy Green’s residence, he had a right to be where he was;

(3) His conduct was not suspicious;

(4) He had not committed a crime, was not committing a crime, and was not about to commit a crime;

(5) He attempted to avoid GZ by running away from him;

(6) GZ provoked a confrontation by getting out of his vehicle and running after him; and

(7) But for Zimmerman pursuing Martin, even after Martin disappeared from view, there never would have been a confrontation and Martin would be alive today.

Conclusion

Whether Martin really feared, merely feared, or did not fear Zimmerman is irrelevant. Whatever Martin may have done, Zimmerman provoked him to do it and this is true whether Martin was a psycho gangsta or a mild mannered non-violent and peaceful kid.

It would take a mighty strange concept of justice to ignore all of the incontrovertible facts and circumstances of this case and allow Zimmerman to walk away from this situation without facing consequences because Trayvon Martin did not run all the way home to Brandy Green’s residence to hide and instead had the temerity to merely ask or demand GZ to explain why he followed him.

The legal elements of self-defense and murder in the second degree do not mention the victim’s character.

The victim can be anyone, good or bad.

The victim in this case was a good kid with a bright future ahead of him, but he did not have to be. He could have been the criminal psycho gangsta George Zimmerman claimed him to be and George Zimmerman would still be guilty of murder in the second degree.

BECAUSE when he shot and killed Trayvon Martin:

(1) Zimmerman was not reasonably in fear of suffering imminent death or serious bodily injury, as shown by the evidence of his minor injuries, the forensic evidence, and his many conflicting and inconsistent statements that are equivalent to a signed confession of guilt; and

(2) the shooting was an imminently dangerous act exhibiting a depraved mind indifferent to Trayvon Martin’s life.

Special thanks to all who participated and helped shape the discussion.

Note: the word “reasonable” is italicized to emphasize the self-defense test is objective

401 Comments | Admission of Guilt, Crime, Depraved Mind, George Zimmerman, Murder 2, Self-defense, Trayvon Martin | Permalink
Posted by masonblue

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